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Abstract: John Lyly developed the prose style that would become known as euphuism, 
named after the main character in his Euphues: The Anatomy of Wit (1578) and 
Euphues and his England (1580). The term ‘euphuism’ signifies the use of 
paradoxical and self-correcting language, while its spokespersons express a great deal 
of self-doubt and contradiction. We can conjecture that Lyly intended his ironic, 
detailed examination of ‘wit’ to dissect both the intellect and its often-inconsistent 
manoeuvrings, revealing a cynical view of human behaviour. In this article, I re-read 
The Anatomy of Wit in the context of a larger body of what I call proto-psychological 
fiction. I argue that certain early modern texts, of which Lyly’s is a strong example, 
share tropes and motifs that indicate the author’s interest in the workings of human 
psychology avant la lettre, and more specifically, of a pessimistic strain of thought that 
is critical of self-awareness and doubtful of our ability to be guided by reason. 
 
The terms ‘psychology’ and ‘psychological’ often appear when discussing the 
development of early modern literary self-fashioning.1 But what exactly do we mean 
by the representation of ‘psychology’ — especially in literature, rather than in moral 
philosophy or religious texts — four hundred years before Freud? How does a fiction 
author from the early modern period write in a mode that is more inclined, we might 
say, to the inner workings of the psyche, long before the advent of free indirect 
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discourse, or realism, or many of the other elements that contributed to the ‘rise’ of 
the novel genre?2  One Elizabethan author who begins to depict consciousness in 
literature is John Lyly, whose prose romances have been called the forerunners of the 
psychological novel in England.3 Lyly developed the prose style that would become 
known as euphuism, named after the main character in his Euphues: The Anatomy of 
Wit (1578) and Euphues and his England (1580).4 As I will define in more detail later, the 
term ‘euphuism’ signifies the use of paradoxical and self-correcting language, while 
its spokespersons express a great deal of self-doubt and contradiction. ‘Wit’, in turn, 
had, from the eleventh century on, the connotation not only of humour, but also the 
‘seat of consciousness or thought or the mind’ and of human understanding and 
reason.5 We can conjecture that Lyly intended his ironic, detailed examination of ‘wit’ 
to dissect both the intellect and its often-inconsistent manoeuvrings, revealing a 
cynical view of human behaviour. In this article, I re-read The Anatomy of Wit in the 
context of a larger body of (what I will now call) proto-psychological fiction. I argue 
that certain early modern texts, of which Lyly’s is a strong example, share tropes and 
motifs that alert us to the presence of the author’s interest in the workings of human 
psychology avant la lettre (that is, before the term became widely used in the 
nineteenth century), and more specifically, of a pessimistic strain of thought that is 
critical of self-awareness and doubtful of our ability to be guided by reason. 
Philosophers, religious figures, and historians have written of the nature of 
human passions since antiquity, and the inclination has often been quite dark: ‘the 
heart is deceitful above all things’, according to Jeremiah 17.9.6 The Greek imperative 
to ‘know thyself’ was born out of a pessimistic paradox; the Greeks were keenly aware 
that ‘self-searching is most commonly the offspring of self-distrust and misgivings’.7 
The Greek view of the self was inherently plagued by doubt, manifested in the 
amorality and arbitrariness of the gods, and the instability of appearances. Thus, 
Herodotus and Thucydides present the inherent irony and inconsequence of heroic 
speeches that appeal to pathos and which cause devastation, and of logical and sound 
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arguments that fail to convince anyone. These authors viewed the very cosmos, the 
order of things, as an ironic mise en abyme (infinite regression), filled with tragicomic 
characters who are poor readers of themselves, of each other, of their environments, 
and of signs from the gods.8  
We tend to think that from antiquity on, the workings of the mind and heart 
were relegated to the study of self-governance via religious texts and moral 
philosophy. But there was also an exploration of the passions (and their relationship 
to reason) in literary form, or what G. K. Hunter calls ‘the rhetoric of the divided 
mind’, which has its origins in Ovid’s Metamorphoses, in his amatory writings (Amores, 
Ars Amatoria, and the Remedia Amoris), and in the fictional Heroides (letters by 
languishing or abandoned women), which had a profound impact on European 
literature from the Middle Ages through to the eighteenth century. 9  In the early 
modern period, we can make a short list of European fictional texts that are much less 
interested in plot than in analysis, or the mining of the recesses of the human psyche. 
In Italian, we can count Boccaccio’s The Elegy of Madonna Fiammetta (1343–4). In France, 
we have, for example, the nouvelles, or tales, of Marguerite de Navarre in the 
Heptaméron (1558) and Madame de Lafayette’s The Princess of Clèves (1678). In England 
during this time, authors like George Pettie, John Lyly, and Robert Greene became 
increasingly engaged in what Helen Moore describes as ‘the exploration of complex 
emotion and motivation, and the articulation of desire’.10 Lyly’s The Anatomy of Wit 
embodies this concept of the ‘divided mind’.  
Lyly borrowed and satirized the character of Euphues from another prose text, 
Roger Ascham’s Schoolmaster (1570), whose Euphues resembles more the ancestor of 
Samuel Richardson’s Sir Charles Grandison than Lyly’s hero. The name signifies 
‘well-grown’, but the later Euphues is a man whose wit is ‘like wax, apt to receive any 
impression’ (Euphues, p. 33). Lyly’s characters are not straightforward at all about their 
intentions, and they do not live in pursuit of wisdom and goodness, while Ascham’s 
erudite character is:  
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apte by goodnes of witte and appliable by readines of will, to learning, having all other qualities 
of the minde and partes of the bodie that must an other day serve learning, not troubled, 
mangled or halfed, but sounde, whole, full, and hable to do their office.11  
Perhaps Lyly’s characters are on their way to learning how to be ‘whole, full or able’, 
wise and judicious, but in the meantime they are only ‘troubled, mangled or halfed’ 
as far as their virtue is concerned. Thus, the motif of ‘education’ from The Schoolmaster 
is distorted into one of desire for pleasure in Lyly’s work. At the beginning of The 
Anatomy of Wit, Euphues is ‘more inclined to wantonness, than to wisdom’ (Euphues, 
p. 42). This initial folly sets the stage for scenes of dissimulation, duplicitous language, 
and, most of all, the strategies of characters who think they know what they want, but 
who discover that they no longer desire their love objects as soon as their love is 
reciprocated. The narrative strategy of euphuism aids in creating ambiguities and 
delays, prolonging desire from reaching fulfilment, and achieving ignorance rather 
than attaining knowledge. 
The beginning of The Anatomy of Wit has a simple plot: in Naples, Euphues goes 
in search of wisdom (already an ironic contradiction, as Theodore Steinberg points 
out, since ‘Italy was the center of all corruption’)12 but instead falls in love with Lucilla, 
who is engaged to Euphues’s friend Philautus.13 Lucilla ends in deceiving them both, 
and each abandons her. Then the two men must repair their friendship and begin 
anew their search for knowledge, this time, supposedly, without the interference of 
women and love. 14  The rhetoric used to narrate this text, however, is far more 
complex. In The Anatomy of Wit, irony and didacticism combine long dialogues, 
debates, and speeches that constitute a dissection of the passions involved in courtly 
gallantry and what Salzman calls ‘a pervasive rhetorical style’ with which characters 
must ‘persuade [themselves] to undertake a particular course of action’.15 Taking the 
correct course of action is problematized from the start, however, since Euphues, as 
Steinberg also points out, is introduced on the very first page as a ‘young gallant, of 
more wit than wealth, and yet of more wealth than wisdom’. 16  Euphuism is 
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characterized by ‘see-saw oppositions’ and is a style ‘rooted in antithetical balance, 
promoted by the use of schemes or figures of sound, notably isocolon (the repetition of 
clauses of the same length), parison (similarly structured sentences) and paramoion 
(sound patterning, e.g. syllabic repetition, assonance and alliteration)’.17  
Moreover, these linguistic gymnastics, characterized by symmetry and 
synchronicity, belie a far less organized mode of thought and behaviour. We see this 
best in scenes that have to do with love and desire. For example, Lucilla’s character 
undergoes a dramatic course of self-deception and self-persuasion in the novel as her 
affections move from man to man. At the beginning of the novel, she is engaged to 
Philautus, but she falls in love with Euphues almost at first sight. Later in the text, her 
affections move on to a third man, Curio. Lucilla’s long speech pondering whether to 
begin a liaison with Euphues — after he and Philautus abruptly leave her house one 
evening, Euphues being overcome by a secret love for Lucilla — is exemplary of the 
manner in which wit works both as a way into a character’s consciousness as well as 
a delaying device. In the first part of Lucilla’s speech, she is very much aware of the 
contradictions of her feelings: 
Ah wretched wench Lucilla, how art thou perplexed! What a doubtful fight dost thou feel betwixt 
faith and fancy, hope and fear, conscience and concupiscence! O my Euphues, little dost thou know 
the sudden sorrow that I sustain for thy sweet sake, whose wit hath bewitched me, whose rare 
qualities have deprived me of mine old quality. (Euphues, p. 51) 
But as her speech continues, she becomes more and more self-deceived:  
Let my father use what speeches he list, I will follow mine own lust. Lust Lucilla, what sayest 
thou? No no, mine own love I should have said, for I am as far from lust, as I am from reason, 
and as near to love as I am to folly. Then stick to thy determination, and show thy self, what 
love can do, what love dares doe, what love hath done. Albeit I can no way quench the coals 
of desire with forgetfulness, yet will I rake them up in the ashes of modesty: Seeing I dare not 
discover my love for maidenly shamefastness, I will dissemble it till time I have opportunity. 
(Euphues, pp. 53–4)  
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Here we see the main themes of proto-psychological fiction: self-deception, error 
(even a Freudian slip!), dissembling, and the confusion of reason and passion where 
there is no one suitable guide for behaviour. Lucilla’s speech travels from defiance 
against her father and certainty in her passions (even though she did not mean to say 
it) to a revision and a reconsideration of her feelings. Although the text is a kind of 
prose romance, Lucilla does not suddenly realize that she is hopelessly in love with 
Euphues in a transcendent and everlasting present. Instead, she carefully considers 
and reconsiders her feelings, and how she will represent them to the world.  
Lucilla implies that she is treading a thin line between reason and folly; she is 
not feeling lust (though her parapraxis indicates that she is deceiving herself), nor is 
it love that she feels. The closest she comes to admitting her passion is when she says 
she feels something near love. Euphuism (that is, contradictory language) reveals in 
Lucilla a resistance to admitting her love plainly, even privately to herself. Her 
promises to hide her love in modesty and ‘maidenly shamefastness’ are negated by 
her accidental admission of ‘lust’ at the beginning of the passage, as well as her 
admission of feeling the heat of the ‘coals of desire’. This speech illustrates that her 
strategy for seducing Euphues consists of dissembling modesty or shame, devices that 
allow Lucilla to put off the decision of pursuing Euphues’s affections openly. At the 
same time, they provide the author space to tease out the hidden motivations and 
secret feelings of his character and to allow her to change her mind several times about 
whether or not she loves Euphues.  
 When Lucilla addresses her new lover directly, she first pushes him away, then 
warms to him, and then recoils again: ‘[t]he favor Lucilla denies with the one hand, 
she extends with the other’.18 In one memorable passage, Lucilla tells Euphues: 
In the coldest flint there is hot fire; the bee that hath honey in her mouth hath a sting in her tail; 
the tree that beareth the sweetest fruit hath a sour sap […] I would not, Euphues, that thou 
shouldst condemn me of rigour in that I seek to assuage thy folly by reason […] whensoever I 
shall love any I will not forget thee. In the mean season account me thy friend, for thy foe I will 
never be. (Euphues, pp. 68–9)  
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The use of braided opposites (cold and hot, honey and sting, sweet and sour, folly and 
reason, friend and foe) in Lucilla’s speech foreshadows her fickle and ultimately cruel 
behaviour later on toward the men who love her. Here she does not tell Euphues she 
is in love with him, but rather projects into some possible future that she may love 
him, were she ever to fall in love. Euphues rightly notices how Lucilla denies and then 
accepts, flirts and then pushes away by responding on a physical level: he ‘was 
brought into a great quandary as it were a cold shivering to hear this new kind of 
kindness — such sweet meat, such sour sauce; such fair words, such faint promises; 
such hot love, such cold desire; such certain hope, such sudden change’ (Euphues, p. 
69, emphasis added), that he is unable to move or speak.19 Again, just as Lucilla only 
feels that she is ‘near’ love, her kindness is expressed in alternately seductive and 
unsatisfying halves, causing Euphues to freeze ‘like one that had looked on Medusa’s 
head and so had been turned into a stone’ (Euphues, p. 69). 
Thus, Euphues’s style is distinctive for pairing opposites, either in paradoxes 
(‘in the coldest flint there is hot fire’) or by contrasting two contradictory courses of 
action (‘she fed him indifferently, with hope and despair, reason and affection, life 
and death’), where there is no clear moral superior within the pairs. According to 
Steinberg, ‘wit is itself of an ambiguous character. It is, in fact, nothing more than that 
faculty which is capable of acting on, organizing, and reacting to any field of human 
endeavor’.20 Similarly, Raymond Stephanson notes, even the ‘apparent ambiguities of 
human action and feeling are referred to a universe that displays its own kinds of 
ambiguities’ in Euphues, and these ambiguities signify an ironic ‘dramatization of the 
characters’ failure to make the correspondence epistemologically adequate’.21 Thus, 
‘wit’ used as a narrative strategy makes characters ‘revise’ their earlier thoughts, 
behaviours, and feelings of certainty. Ultimately, it is a discourse of frustration whose 
rumination and thought is presented to the reader through these opposites. I argue 
here that characters’ minds do not necessarily become intelligible through wit as a 
mode of deliberation, self-analysis, and self-revision, but rather that a lack of system 
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emerges. This emphasis on a kind of randomness that mirrors the irrational human 
psyche is another striking feature of proto-psychological fiction in the early modern 
era.22  
On the level of vocabulary, certain verbs, such as to think, to believe, and to 
dare, as well as verbs of seeing and seeming, illustrate, in proto-psychological fiction, 
that one character is attempting to produce knowledge about another, to read herself, 
or to do both. This is opposed to the Aristotelian model, in which nature divulges 
itself and its differences to impressionable humans, whose role is a ‘systematic 
understander’, as Jonathan Lear calls them.23 For Aristotle, it is ‘by looking out to the 
world that man’s soul maps the structure of the world’ and in turn, ‘he can also look 
to the world to see the structure of his soul mapped there’.24 Thus, the drive to know 
also means the drive to structure, clarify, and diagram; to look at the world inherently 
involves attempting to begin to understand and map it, to be part of it, to hold it and 
make it stable. But in proto-psychological fiction, characters who attempt to look 
within themselves are usually wrong in some way. They are mistaken about their own 
knowledge, about a belief, or about someone else’s motivations, so that characters 
engage in infinite reciprocities, moving to and fro, unable to alight on any stable truth. 
We see, for example, a great emphasis placed on dissimulation, deception, self-
deception, and mistaken identities, as well as figures of masks and mirrors, in 
sixteenth-and seventeenth-century literature.25   
The political danger of being ‘seen’ without one’s mask on is especially dire in 
the early modern period. While today popular wisdom dictates that we ‘follow our 
hearts’ and not be ‘so cerebral’ about making decisions, the goal of the early modern 
courtier was to appear as emotionless, as calm as possible, and as indifferent. As 
conduct books from the early modern period testify, there is an inherent social and 
political danger in affettazione, or affectation, as opposed to sprezzatura or studied 
nonchalance. 26  To reveal strong emotions at court, for example, was a sign of 
weakness and of the inevitability of downfall. Courtiers were expected to be capable 
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of controlling and hiding their passions and affecting a sense of calm and virtue (and 
thus, reason) in all matters. In fact, they risked losing their place in it if they did not 
dissimulate. Since the rigid political structure of the court controlled most forms of 
communication, watching (which could be remarked upon less than, say, speaking 
and writing) becomes a standard trope of early modern literature.27 At the same time, 
however, Renaissance authors were able to expose the inner turmoil, the self-
deception, and the dissimulation of characters through narrative.  
The nature of the essay, as half-literary, half moralistic (in the French sense of 
manners, not morality) treatise on behaviour and thought, manages to expose the folly 
of human motivation at the same time as counselling how to enact it. Francis Bacon’s 
essay ‘On Simulation and Dissimulation’ (1597) lays out three ‘great advantages’ of 
concealing the truth.28 ‘First’, writes Bacon, it is an advantage ‘to lay asleep opposition, 
and to surprise. For where a man’s intentions are published, it is an alarum, to call up 
all that are against them’ (p. 227). Another advantage of dissimulation for Bacon is:  
the better to discover the mind of another. For to him that opens himself, men will hardly show 
themselves adverse; but will fair let him go on, and turn their freedom of speech to freedom of 
thought. And therefore it is a good shrewd proverb of the Spaniard, ‘Tell a lie and find a truth’ 
(p. 227). 
Bacon’s essay in many ways resembles the moraliste writing of seventeenth-century 
France, like that of Pascal and La Rochefoucauld, but the element of surprise recalls 
Lady Macbeth entreating her husband to be less obvious and to act like a snake ready 
to strike: 
Your face, my thane, is as a book where men 
May read strange matters. To beguile the time, 
Look like the time; bear welcome un your eye, 
Your hand, your tongue: look like the innocent flower, 
But be the serpent under.29 
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To see correctly is the goal, but to be seen correctly is dangerous; thus it is desirable 
to cover up a lie, sometimes, as Gracian and Bacon recommend, with the truth itself.  
Macbeth’s vacillation in the first act of Shakespeare’s play, his need for 
certainty, his slips and confidences, all work against him, so that his wife sees the need 
for affecting a sweet and innocent persona in order to be capable of acting in the 
subsequent scenes of the play. Similarly, as many critics beginning with A. C. Bradley 
point out, in Othello Shakespeare presents two extremes in Iago and the eponymous 
hero, the ability to dissimulate the truth and the utter inability to conceal one’s 
passions and beliefs, respectively.30 Even if the goal is not necessarily as extreme as 
covering up a murder, as in Shakespeare’s plays, Gracian’s maxim of telling a lie and 
finding a truth, and the paradox of discovering what is hidden from view in what is 
obvious, and vice versa, helps us to understand the overall worldview of proto-
psychological fiction. Moreover, a reader needs to be comfortable with contradiction 
in order to interpret Lyly’s particular method of what Scragg calls ‘destabilization of 
meaning’ (Euphues, p. 11) wherein there is ‘“nothing” constant “but inconstancy”’ 
(Euphues, p. 1).  
By contradicting and doubling back on what has just been said, wit mediates 
between strong passions and the analysis that tempers them, delaying decisions and 
certainty and acting as a medium for deliberation, analysis, and thought. Moreover, 
wit functions to keep both relationships and speech unconsummated and open-
ended. The contradictions that make up euphuism as a mode of speech make for 
perplexing and counter-intuitive discourse, through which characters vacillate about 
and debate contrary claims and desires. When a character does make a decision, it 
usually is an irrational or impetuous one. For example, Euphues ultimately interprets 
Lucilla’s speech above as a lover would, deceiving himself in the belief that her 
hedging words indicate she truly loves him (he reacts ‘to this new kind of kindness’ 
as a true admission of love). Thus, he actively ignores half of the words she speaks: 
‘[i]f my tongue were able to utter the joys that my heart hath conceived, I fear me 
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thought I be well beloved, yet I should hardly be believed. Ah my Lucilla, how much 
am I bound to thee’ (Euphues, p. 70). Euphues deceives himself in his willingness to 
disregard Lucilla’s ambiguity and, furthermore, to mistake her vagueness for a sign 
of intimacy. And yet, just as Euphues stands stone still, paused in the act of reflecting 
on Lucilla’s words, their intimacy is diminishing.  
Even the narrator pauses his story every now and again in an attempt to 
explicate what Lucilla thinks, further delaying the action of the story. For example, 
the narrator states:  
truly I know not whether it be peculiar to that sex to dissemble with those whom they most 
desire, or whether by craft they have learned outwardly to loath that which inwardly they most 
love: yet wisely did she cast this in her head, that if she should yield at the first assault, he 
would think her a light huswife: if she should reject him scornfully a very haggard: minding 
therefore that he should neither take hold of her promise, neither unkindness in her 
preciseness, she fed him indifferently, with hope and despair, reason and affection, life and 
death (Euphues, p. 74). 
Just as Lucilla mistakes folly for reason earlier in the work, here again, she half-rejects 
Euphues in order to further draw him in to her. Dissecting each possible reaction that 
her would-be lover could have to different modes of her behaviour, Lucilla chooses 
neither to yield nor to scorn, neither promise nor unkindness. And yet, Lucilla’s 
‘careful’ hedging leads her, in fact, to treat Euphues rather badly, forcing him to 
endure the extremes of ‘hope and despair’, and what feel like choices of ‘life and 
death’. Though the narrator claims that he does not know precisely why Lucilla 
behaves the way she does,31 it is also unclear to the reader why Euphues responds so 
positively to Lucilla’s ambivalent — and apparently harmful — speeches, and 
moreover, why he believes that Lucilla is truly falling in love with him.  
Eventually Philautus implores Euphues to abandon Lucilla by attempting to 
use somewhat more logical discourse:32 
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Couldst thou […] for the love of a fruitless pleasure violate the league of a faithful friendship; 
didst though weigh more the enticing looks of a lewd wench than the entire love of a loyal 
friend? If thou didst determine with thyself at the first to be false, why didst thou swear to be 
true; if to be true, why art thou false? (Euphues, p. 77) 
Philautus’s series of questions to Euphues provides a contrast to the way in which 
Lucilla’s phrases are constructed with intentionally paired opposites. Instead, he 
untangles the contradictions and asks logical questions about Euphues’s motivations 
(if you swore to be true, why were you false? Why can you not see clearly the 
difference between lewdness and loyalty?). Thus, he claims to be baffled by Euphues’s 
lack of reason (ignoring the fact that he himself had been in love with the ‘lewd wench’ 
at the beginning of the story). Here, Philautus makes a strong argument that critiques 
losing sight of the ‘true’ intimacy of friendship:  
If thou wast minded both falsely and forgedly to deceive me, why didst thou flatter and 
dissemble with me at the first; if to love me, why didst thou flinch at the last? If the sacred 
bands of amity did delight thee, why didst though break them? (Euphues, p. 77)  
Philautus refuses to participate in the dissembling discourse of what a character in 
Marguerite de Navarre calls ‘vicious’ love.33 Nevertheless, Philautus himself still uses 
a kind of euphuistic rhetoric, even when he is pointing out its follies. He still cannot 
speak directly; his words are always nuanced. Not surprisingly, during this time, and 
even after they have reconciled, the two best friends drift farther and farther apart. It 
turns out that they are not so similar after all, and since Euphues is in search of 
wisdom and Philautus is more interested in seeking out the pleasures of the court, 
they decide to separate amicably soon after the conclusion of the drama with Lucilla. 
We can interpret the grammar of euphuistic rhetoric as a device that creates 
both inroads and barriers between characters, mirroring the structure of the episodes 
that draw characters close together and then separates them physically. For example, 
the first time that Euphues and Lucilla meet, when Philautus takes his friend along to 
Lucilla’s house for dinner, ‘[t]he gentlewoman, whether it were for niceness or for 
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niggardness of courtesy, gave him such a cold welcome that he repented that he was 
come’ (Euphues, p. 47). Yet, her refusal to ‘lend him a friendly look’ (Euphues, p. 47) 
encourages Euphues to pursue her all the more:  
Euphues, though he perceived her coy nip, seemed not to care for it, but taking her by the hand 
[…] fed of one dish which ever stood before him, the beauty of Lucilla. Here Euphues at the 
first sight was so kindled with desire that almost he was like to burn to coals (Euphues, p. 47– 8).  
Again, this turns out to be a typical move of proto-psychological fiction: the best way 
to attract a desired lover is to feign rejection and dissimulate indifference. Lucilla 
knows exactly what strategy to use to captivate Euphues. Euphuism as a discourse, 
though it is highly mannered, works quite well to explore this romantic strategy that 
centralizes dissimulation.  
Like so many other conduct manuals of this era (even the ones Lyly himself 
mocked), Euphues can be read as a veiled political text that warns of the perils of 
revealing one’s true feelings. Those who have all of their mental faculties must 
necessarily maintain a strict distinction between appearances and reality to succeed in 
early modern courtly culture. In this way, Gohlke interprets ambiguous language in 
The Anatomy of Wit in a historical-political context:  
[t]he opposition is consistent between faith and fraud, words and works, mouth and mind […]. 
In a world where words cannot be trusted, where appearances are deceptive, speech serves 
both as a barrier and protection, simultaneously aggravating and mitigating the problem to 
which it responds […]. The ambiguity of the euphuistic rhetoric provides a measure of 
protection in an ambiguous and potentially dangerous environment.34 
Read in light of early modern ambiguity and Baroque deceptive appearances, games of 
hide and seek, and the ‘potentially dangerous environment’ to which Gohlke refers, 
when a character ceases to maintain this doubleness, this sprezzatura, it is often a mark 
of madness. That Philautus thinks the bonds of male friendship exempt him and 
Euphues from the social precept of dissimulation is folly, too. Philautus’s inability to 
speak in anything but euphuistic discourse highlights his error.  
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 By putting off decisions, resisting assurance that a certain course of action is 
the right one — in short, by remaining ambiguous — the narrative swells with 
representations of characters’ failed readings of the world around them. The pattern 
of hiding and seeking knowledge serves to delay action and certainty, causing 
characters to, in turns, draw closer together and then farther apart by long speeches 
that claim contradictory emotions. In this way, action is almost always inhibited and 
intimacy almost always fails in Euphues. Rather than helping characters find meaning 
and wisdom, wit at the beginning of the text is an inhibiting force that causes them to 
over-deliberate their choices and to become lost in rhetoric. Euphues’s circular rhetoric 
and over-analysis underline a kind of fear and uncertainty about the self and the 
future. It is a rather dark view of human nature, but one that is typical of proto-
psychological fiction in the early modern period. The Anatomy of Wit, then, comprises 
an important step in the creation of Elizabethan psychology. Moreover, since Lyly’s 
prose texts clearly influenced Shakespeare’s comedies, reading Euphues as a work of 
proto-psychological fiction side by side with these works may help shed more light 
on the portrayal of ambiguity, self-deception, and irony in the Bard’s plays. 
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Jonathan Bate (Shakespeare and Ovid [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994]) point out, much of Lyly’s 
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Card for Philautus and all Fond Lovers’ (Euphues, p. 88) is an adaptation of Ovid’s Remedia Amoris. The 
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